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 In recent years, America has seen a rise in insider threat related incidents. Insider 
threats are individual with placement and access to critical infrastructures, military units, and 
the government and their supporting agencies who have turned against and targeted their 
parent organization aiding a foreign power or international terrorist organization. 
Understanding this, this paper analyzes how successful the United States Intelligence 
Community has been in responding to insider threats. For this thesis, literature will serve as a 
base for establishing doctrinal knowledge, with interviews, with current members of the IC 
working on insider threat issues, supplementing knowledge gaps about real world 
application. This paper has found that US policies in the past five years have made great 
advances in addressing insider threats problems, but there is room for improvement. These 
improvements will be difficult to adopt because of the impediments to reform, but are 
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Preface0 
When a portion of the population, no matter how incredibly small and seemingly 
insignificant, turns against its own, whether it be through violent acts or espionage, a largely 
invisible but very dangerous threat is present. The people who commit these crimes of 
betrayal are no different than the average person. They go to school, work, eat, and live in the 
same places their fellow citizens do, but their true loyalty is not to America, it is to the 
foreign powers that control them. This threat, which exists from within our own ranks, can 
kill indiscriminately and damage American national security severely and in various ways. 
However, it can be prevented, and there are ways to mitigate and prevent the threats posed by 
“insiders.” 
 The United States has done a good job of adapting in recent years to the increase of 
these “insider threat” activities. However, the efforts to date are not enough, and the large 
importance stressed by the President shows the threat is not diminishing. We must make 
further improvements, including the fundamental ways in which we perceive, identify, and 
counter insider threats. This thesis will seek to answer one main question: How successful 
has the United States Intelligence Community (IC) been in responding to the increase of 
insider threats? 
 In order to answer this overarching question, we must first answer five sub-questions.  
1. What is an insider threat? 
2. Where do insider threats come from? 
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3. How have these threats impacted the Intelligence Community? 
4. How will the different Insider Threat Groups increase the IC’s ability to target insider 
threats? 
5. What changes are still needed to best defend the United States? 
 Answering these questions is the best way to analyze the Intelligence Community’s 
response because it breaks down insider threats, and IC responses, to their raw elements. 
Only once these ideas have been decomposed can they be built back up in a complete picture 
of all actions taken to counter this developing threat. By answering the first question (What is 
an insider threat?), the author will show that with as many organizations as there are in the 
IC’s Counterintelligence Community there are as many different definitions of insider 
threats. Given that disparity the author will present the best definition possible to press 
forward with analysis of insider threats. The second question (Where do insider threats come 
from?) is designed to give analysis in how individuals who were once loyal to the United 
States can betray their country. This will be important to understand because the first part of 
understanding how to counter a threat is identifying where it came from. The third question 
(How have these threats impacted the Department of Defense and National Intelligence 
Agencies?), will establish the basic structure that the IC has been forced to develop to cope 
with insiders. This will help the reader to understand the dramatic impact that threats have on 
the development of policy and organizations within the IC. The fourth question (How have 
the different insider threat groups increased the IC’s ability to target insider threats?) will 
highlight the recent changes that have been taken across the IC to enhance cooperation in the 
fight against insider threats. Finally the last question (What changes are still needed to help 
combat the insider threat?) will reveal the necessary steps that the author feels the IC should 
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take to repair weaknesses uncovered in the analysis of the systems revealed answering the 
first four questions. Each of the first four questions will attempt to develop the insider threat 
and the IC response while the final question is designed to assess what is still needed.  
With such emphasis placed on insider threats by the President of the United States, 
the preservation and proper employment of a multitude of new research currently underway 
is vitally important to our national security. The findings of this thesis will build upon topics 
addressed by many different research initiatives and operational organizations to offer some 
new insights. 
Of particular note, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT®) Program at 
Carnegie Mellon University has been chartered by the United States government to provide 
research, analysis, and recommendations of insider threat-related topics to the Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) and the Intelligence Community (IC) 1. In 
addition to CERT®, the Department of Defense and the Defense Personnel Security Research 
Office have conducted studies relating to insider threat program analysis, threat prevention, 
and past threat assessments. This research will provide useful insight into case studies and 
proven problems and advantages of insider threat programs. 
 This paper will use many different types of sources to answer the proposed thesis 
questions. Current literature will be very important, and will be used to capture academic and 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  CERT®	  Program	  is	  a	  federally	  funded	  program	  that	  was	  established	  to	  conduct	  research,	  provide	  
findings	  and	  recommendations,	  and	  facilitate	  communication	  among	  community	  experts	  regarding	  cyber	  
security.	  It	  has,	  since	  its	  inception,	  been	  tasked	  with	  the	  additional	  mission,	  “To	  enable	  effective	  insider	  
threat	  programs	  by	  performing	  research,	  modeling,	  analysis,	  and	  outreach	  to	  define	  socio-­‐technical	  best	  
practices,	  so	  that	  organizations	  are	  better	  able	  to	  deter,	  detect,	  and	  respond	  to	  evolving	  Insider	  Threats.”	  
This	  change	  of	  mission	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  become	  the	  government’s	  leader	  on	  insider	  threat	  research.	  
(The	  CERT	  Insider	  Threat	  Center,	  “Mission”	  http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/,	  05	  June	  2012.)	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theoretical understandings of insider threats throughout the analysis. However, literature 
alone cannot provide all the details for the effectiveness of policy. For this thesis, literature 
will serve as a good supplement to integrate interviews with current members of the IC 
working on insider threat issues. Such a vast range of sources is necessary because a true 
understanding of how the IC has identified and responded to the insider threat can only be 
garnered through a study of the written policies and real-world practices. Given the disparity 
that often exists in government between what is written on paper and what is practiced in 
application, interviews with IC officials will fill the gaps regarding what actually happens2. 
Discussions with these individuals will provide the best look into “real-world” practices 
versus the required practices on paper. Lastly, subject matter experts will also be able to 
provide some insights into those practices that have aided them in the field and could best 
become formal policy. 
 As with all studies in Intelligence, there will be some limitations to the depth of the 
research covered in this paper. The main limitation for this paper will center on the nature of 
the subject, counterintelligence, and the amount of available research. When discussing 
Counterintelligence, the availability of details and programs is often very obscure. The 
reason for this abstruse nature is because Counterintelligence organizations are established to 
protect America’s secrets. Defense missions like this will generally restrict the amount of 
information publicly available so as to not compromise strategic visions and specific tactics.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This author will be implementing qualitative research methods, to include contributions of relevant subject 
matter experts, such as the Co-Director of the Joint Insider Threat Task Force, a Community wide organization 
established by the President and tasked with enacting the National Insider Threat Policy, as well as 
representatives of the National Counterintelligence Executive’s Office, and other members of the 
Counterintelligence Community some of who have been working in the CI field for in excess of 30 years. 
Counterintelligence Special Agent-in-training allows me access to individuals who have been working in the CI 
field for some in excess of 30 years. 
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 Lastly, before beginning any analysis, this author, a Counterintelligence Special 
Agent, realizes that all people are susceptible to their own personal biases. Richards J. Heuer, 
a veteran of over 45 years in the CIA and author of Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, says 
that one’s personal biases are the mental shortcuts that human beings take to help them come 
to the conclusions that they draw. Serving in the field, while having its benefits, also leaves 
this author susceptible to bias of analyzing his own parent organization. In additions to the 
author’s bias as a CI agent, the application of research and interviews from SME’s within the 
CI field will provide the potential for personal biases to be voiced rather than honest 
assessments. To avoid both of these biases, a substantial amount of literature, doctrine, and 
public policy will be referenced to provide a better technical understanding and to keep 
personal opinions out of the narrative. Understanding these biases and how the human mind 
operates will better allow the author to remain objective regarding the analysis within this 
paper, and to look for biases placed on given the presented ideas and policies. After all, the 
essence of good analysis is “how to make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about 
the judgments and conclusions themselves3.”  
 This thesis is one that will focus on a threat that until recently has not been a chief 
priority of the IC. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fixed intelligence officials on one 
theater of the world with a level of policy paralysis not seen since the Cold War4. As the 
United States withdraws from nearly thirteen years of fighting abroad and the IC begins the 
reorganization process, officials will soon realize that such an intense focus on the wars 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Heuer, Richards J. “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.” Center for the Study of Intelligence: Washington 
DC, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. 
 
4 Policy paralysis refers to the fixation that US Intelligence has placed on current threats. Policy Paralysis leads 
the IC to remain fixed on one issue and miss all other developing or current threats. 
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overseas have left us vulnerable to the “wars” being fought on our home soil. This study will 
provide a new way of looking at threats that are very difficult to identify, how some very 
minor changes can greatly improve successes in preventing insiders from becoming threats, 
and how to build upon current proven success for greater community-wide successes in the 
future.  
 The reason that this is so important is because of the potential damage these types of 
insiders can cause. Nidal Hassan, the Fort Hood shooter and an insider threat, entered the 
Reverse Soldier Readiness Processing Center at Fort Hood, Texas and killed 13 American 
service members5. Bradley Manning, an Army Private with a Top Secret clearance and an 
insider threat, published over 700,000 classified documents to Wikileaks6. Which as Michelle 
Van Cleve, former head of U.S. counterintelligence under President George W. Bush, writes 
ultimately “had repercussions across the world, breaching confidences, embarrassing friends 
and allies, undermining US credibility, putting the lives of American soldiers and Afghan 
informants in danger and operations at risk7.” 
In summary, a myriad of research is beginning to be conducted on insider threats, but 
this threat is constantly evolving. Until the United States creates a way permanently to 
prevent insider threats, research will be needed to identify the latest developing trends and 
techniques to combat them. Failure to stay up to date with these threats is not an option as 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Joseph Lieberman. A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From The U.S. Government’s Failure To 
Prevent The Fort Hood Attack. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Fort_Hood/FortHood Report.pdf?attempt=2, Washington D.C., 
February 2007, pg. 7. 
 
6 Included in these were Combat Strategies, State Department cables, and terrorism detainee assessments. 
 
7 Michelle Van Cleave, “Myth, Paradox & The Obligations Of Leadership: Edward Snowden, Bradley Manning 
and the Next Leak,” Center for Security Policy, Occasional Paper Series. September 2013. 
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one mistake could be the difference between a foiled attack or the next Bradley Manning or 
Nadal Hassan.   
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Chapter 1: What is an Insider Threat? 
Our planet is home to over 190 different countries, all with unique economic, 
political, and religious goals8. The one commonality among them all is a desire for self-
preservation. No matter the size, big or small, all countries strive for continued existence and 
will do whatever they can to protect themselves from the many threats they face. Tactics 
employed by nations in the pursuit of political power have varied over time with the 
evolution in weapons, technology, and national interests. One tactic that has been prevalent 
throughout history, however, is the use of insiders, or insider threats9. 
The term “insider threat” is a buzzword; it is used to refer to a specific threat that the 
United States faces from its enemies. The term has been used in many different studies 
including those conducted by the CERT Program, the National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council, the White House, the Congressional Review Service, and the RAND Corporation10. 
Each of these studies gives a slightly different definition of an insider threat, and each has 
used that definition to fashion the arguments proposed in their studies. Of the many studies 
that have been conducted looking at insider threats, the National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council has one of the best definitions, which defines an insider threat as, “one or more 
individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This number will differ depending on the constant change of the nation. 
 
9 One of the earliest accounts of an insider threat is from the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC when Ephialtes 
of Trachisas went to Xerxes and betrayed his fellow Greeks telling the Persian Army how to flank the Greek 
position, thus defeating the Spartan forces. (Terry Crowdy, The Enemy Within A History Of Spies, Spymasters 
And Espionage, (London: Osprey Publishing, 2014)). 
 
10 The CERT Program alters their definition of insider threats to focus more on the aspects of threats to Cyber 
Security and information systems. The White House, the Congressional Research Service, and RAND have 
very generic definitions that are lacking in specifics. 
 
	  
9	   	  
enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security 
systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm11.” While this is one of 
the best definitions, it does not quite sum up an insider threat; it is missing one essential 
element, a foreign nexus. 
One important fact to keep in mind when defining an insider threat is who is 
responsible for combatting them. The answer is the Counterintelligence Community under 
the direction of the National Counterintelligence Executive, one of the offices in the Office 
for the Director of National Intelligence. As laid out in the President’s 2009 National 
Counterintelligence Strategy, the CI Community is responsible for “detecting insider 
threats.” By giving CI jurisdiction over insider threats, the Director of National Intelligence 
has essentially made them a CI issue, which means an insider threat must meet the 
qualifications of a Counterintelligence crime. Executive Order 12333 describes 
Counterintelligence as, “information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, 
exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or 
their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities12.” The essential elements of 
this definition are the crimes and the foreign nexus. 
 The foreign nexus is significant, because without that tie, these would not be CI 
crimes; they would be domestic crimes outside of the CI mission. This is a point that has 
been of contention in the United States Intelligence Community for several years when 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Thomas Noonan and Edmund Archuleta, “The Insider Threat to Critical Infrastructures.” The National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council Report. April 2008. 
 
12 Ronald Reagan, “Executive Order 12333—US Federal Intelligence Activities.” December 1981. 
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arguing who has jurisdiction over domestic terrorism. The important thing to note is that 
domestic terrorism “involves violence against the civilian population or infrastructure of a 
nation—often but not always by citizens of that nation and often with the intent to intimidate, 
coerce, or influence national policy13.” This definition shows that in fact all violent insider 
threats are domestic terrorists; it does not however mean that all domestic terrorists are 
insider threats. This is important to clarify because one of the main missions of 
Counterintelligence is exploitation of our foreign enemies.  A domestic terrorist without 
foreign ties offers nothing to Counterintelligence agents. So while the FBI is likely to handle 
both cases the methods that they use to investigate them will differ. Keeping this in mind can 
better help define exactly what an insider threat is.  
For the purpose of this study, an insider threat is a traitor.  These are individuals with 
placement and access to critical infrastructures, military units, and the government and their 
supporting agencies, who have turned against and targeted their parent organization aiding a 
foreign power or international terrorist organization14. This definition of insider threats 
explains why the CI community has adapted over the years to meet the coming challenges 
presented by insider threats. It also takes into account the necessary foreign nexus in addition 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 RAND. “Domestic Terrorism.” http://www.rand.org/topics/domestic-terrorism.html, 01 December 2013. 
 
14 Insiders can also target businesses and other areas of the economic sector, but this paper will look more to the 
traditional insider threats presented to the Counterintelligence Community rather than domestic law 
enforcement. Aiding a foreign power is used in US Code Title 18, Chapter 37- Espionage. Section 798-
Disclosure of Classified Information. (Nicholas Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners: Defending Against Insider 
Threats to Critical Infrastructures” Naval Post-Graduate School, September 2009). 
 
	  
11	   	  
to the specific crimes that CI is responsible for investigating. Ultimately, these crimes are 
designed to harming our national security in several ways15. 
The harm inflicted by insider threats may take on various forms of crimes. There are 
insider threats that will commit acts of espionage, terrorist actions, or acts of economic and 
cyber sabotage. Ultimately, these are all insider threats, but for the Counterintelligence 
community, the chief concerns lie in the two main types of crimes—espionage/intelligence 
crimes and terrorist actions. These are the threats that the Counterintelligence community 
seeks to stamp out and from which they derive their principal mission, which is protecting 
the state and helping it to survive. 
The survival instinct of states is what has led to some of the largest and most 
technologically advanced countries in history to search out and find their enemy’s, and even 
closest friend’s “secrets.” The “secrets” of states are often the inner workings of their 
government, military, and industrial sectors. These can offer insights into the political and 
military technologies, strategies, and plans that help aid their competitiveness and survival. 
Acquiring this information provides states with advantages over their adversaries because it 
is what Sun Tzu says “enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, 
and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men,” and to “win without striking” It gives 
states what he calls foreknowledge16. This foreknowledge not only reveals to leaders how to 
array their defenses, when enemies might strike, or how they can defeat their enemy, even if 
outnumbered and outgunned, but it can also reveal how they might interact with other states 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Robert M. Bryant, “The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America.” Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive, 2009. 
 
16 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Filiquarian, 2006) pg.65-68. 
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to best set themselves up for survival. In essence, foreknowledge gives leaders what they 
need to make the best decisions for their countries, What Sun Tzu calls foreknowledge, we 
call intelligence. 
 Intelligence is many things. It is the process through which we evaluate information.  
It is the product that we produce from analysis.  And it is the organization that collects and 
analyzes the information17. Beyond all of that, intelligence is a tool. It gives decision makers 
the necessary information to make the best-informed decisions. Clausewitz refers to 
intelligence as the complete understanding of another nation’s character, institutions, and 
state of affairs. This, he states, will help the policy maker understand and formulate an 
assessment of another country’s most likely course of action18. When a nation’s intelligence 
is uncovered by another country, suddenly the latter state’s advantage is lost. And, assuming 
that country does not know about its loss, its enemy now has the advantage, for they 
understand the other nation’s weaknesses and can change their strategies, move forces, and 
reallocate resources to get an edge on its blinded foe. How does this happen? How can one 
country get access to such closely guarded secrets? The oldest and most reliable method is 
betrayal by traitors. 
Betrayal of one’s own country by handing over intelligence, or spying, is not a new 
tactic.  For as long as states have existed, they have spied on one another. It is part of human 
nature. In fact, Sun Tzu says the best way to acquire intelligence is “from the enemy himself, 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. (4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), pg. 1. 
 
18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 1976), Book 1, Chapter 6. 
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through spies”19. The reasons that individuals become spies vary and include ideological 
differences within their governments, religious ideals, and money, to name a few. Regardless 
of their reasons, states that take advantage of the disloyalty and other weaknesses of their 
enemy’s countrymen can often find a wealth of intelligence that will assure continued 
survival as a state. 
Spies, however, are not the only intelligence insiders; another type of intelligence 
insider is the “leaker.” Individuals such as Bradley Manning, who release or leak national 
defense information and classified material, have a more obscure foreign nexus, but they are 
just as guilty of giving information to the enemy as those that hand it to them directly. Under 
United States Code Title 18, Chapter 37, Espionage, there are multiple Sections that discuss 
the crimes of espionage20. These crimes, while each addressing a different aspect of 
espionage, all convey that any individual who lawfully has “possession of, access to, control 
over, or is entrusted with information” which reasonable belief would suggest could be used 
“to the advantage of any foreign nation” has committed espionage21. By taking Defense 
information and publishing it on the internet, Bradley Manning was making information 
publicly available to Foreign Intelligence Security Service (FISS). So while he may not have 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Sun Tzu, pg. 65. 
 
20 Crimes falling under Title 18 Chapter 37, §  793. Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information; § 794. 
Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government, §  795. Photographing and sketching 
defense installations, §  796. Use of aircraft for photographing defense installations, §  797. Publication and sale 
of photographs of defense installations, §  798. Disclosure of classified information, §  798A. Temporary 
extension of section 794, §  799. Violation of regulations of National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
 
21 Quotation is extracted from Section 793, Gathering transmitting or losing defense information, however the 
language used in Section 793 is very similar to the other sections of Chapter 37. “To the advantage of a foreign 
nation” is an expression used in all description of espionage crimes and is specific to no singular Section of 
Chapter 37. (United States Government Printing Office, “United States Code, Title 18, Chapter 37: Espionage 
and Censorship”, December 2012).  
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met with a handler, there is reasonable belief that by his publishing that information, a 
foreign power could use the information to their benefit. This foreign nexus, while not as 
direct as spying, is what makes leakers just as much of an insider threat. Additionally, this 
type of insider is potentially more problematic than a spy because they can commit their acts 
of espionage while hiding behind the computer screen. This modern day technological shield 
acts as a protection for the insider and makes finding their identification very difficult. 
Betrayals are not just related to stealing information. They often result in unexpected 
attacks. Antoine-Henri Jomini writes, “Advantage should be taken of all opportunities for 
surprising an adversary,” because taking an enemy by surprise enables a force to attack 
before the other can “make preparations for an attack22.” What better way to surprise one’s 
enemy than to have a traitor willing to conduct that attack, or to provide critical information 
that facilitates a military, terrorist, or other strike?  
Those willing to kill their own countrymen, like those willing to steal their country’s 
secrets, are often driven by deep ideological differences with their own country, making them 
susceptible to the recruitment efforts of foreign powers. Clausewitz reminds us that “War is 
an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force23.” By persuading 
the people within a country to attack their own, an enemy can create the many “minor 
incidents” that no leader can “really foresee to lower the general level of performance so that 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art Of War. (A new ed. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), Chapter 6 
Article XXXIV. 
 
23 Clausewitz, Book 1 Chapter 1 Section 3. 
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one always falls short of the intended goals24.” The world is not comprised entirely of large 
states with comparable military capabilities. There are small states that would never be able 
to compete on a conventional scale. For them, attacks conducted by dissident insiders allow 
them to level the playing field. This sudden equalizer can bring the most powerful countries 
to their knees by targeting the homeland, which damages much more than infrastructure. It 
damages the very psyche and morale of the population. 
Often, the psychological damage that is done can be more destructive than the actual 
physical damage. In the history of the United States no insider attack has yet achieved its 
stated objectives25. However, these attacks drive serious debates within the target country as 
to what current policies should be. A key problem is that such attacks give international 
terrorist organizations propaganda to further their cause. In a time of fourth- generation 
warfare, where international perception becomes paramount in effective foreign relations, the 
terrorist and other actions taken by insider threats give direct support to an enemy and make 
it appear even stronger than it is26.  Ultimately, the enemy can exploit this perception to give 
them real advantages.  This struggle against fourth-generation threats has led the United 
States to all corners of the globe searching out and killing the members of these parent 
terrorist organizations hoping to end the terrorist and insider threats to the United States.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Clausewitz refers to these minor incidents as the “frictions” of war, or the things that leaders cannot 
anticipate, war in reality, that will prevent them from executing theirs plans and strategies, or the “war on 
paper.” (Clausewitz, Book 1 Chapter 1 Section 7) 
 
25 Actual insider attacks such as the Little Rock Recruiting Station Shootings, Fort Hood Shooting, and Boston 
Marathon Bombing never accomplished their mission, but they have furthered support for international terrorist 
organizations and promoted their mission of fighting the United States. 
26 The modern era of warfare, in which battle lines are blurred and there is little difference between a civilian 
and a military target. Terrorism is one of the main tactics used and hence insider threats the ultimate attack 
mechanism. (William Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” Marine Corps 
Gazette. October 1989). 
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Unfortunately, much of the US effort has been devoted to fighting threats abroad, 
while domestic ones fall to the wayside. Throughout the past 75 years, the United States 
government has become preoccupied with a single kind of warfare however, the world is not 
such a black and white place, and most of our enemies will not fight a conventional, 
symmetric war with the United States. At any given time the threats that are present to a 
nation are vast, leaving US policy directed at one fight lacking on other fronts. During World 
War II, the preoccupation of US policy makers became so wrapped up with the fight against 
Fascism that the government for the large part missed the many deep penetrations the Soviet 
Union had made in the United States government27. Five years later, once the fighting had 
quelled and the United States moved out of a state of “hot war” in Europe, the government 
quickly discovered the many Soviet penetrations and the US as the Cold War began. This 
conflict lasted for over forty years and resulted in a sort of policy paralysis that caused the 
United States to miss the rise of terrorism and violent Islamic extremists as well as insider 
threats. Finally in the years preceding September 2001, policy again went “hot” with the fight 
against radical Islamic terrorists. What has been missed since then? Jennifer Sims, professor 
at John Hopkins University, thinks we have fallen victim to insider threats because our 
preoccupation with Muslim extremist groups (another form of policy paralysis) has left us 
open and vulnerable. She believes while we have been away fighting our wars, the Chinese 
and others have made massive gains by exploiting and exporting our military and economic 
secrets, often with the help of insiders. This trend needs to come to an end, and as the United 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 During World War II Soviet spies penetrated upper levels at the State Dept. (Alger Hiss), the Manhattan 
Project (Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenburgs), and even the Executive Office (Lauchlin Currie, Executive Assistant 
to President Roosevelt) (Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin 
Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, (Basic Books: 1999)). 
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States looks to pull back its troop presence in the Middle East, policymakers must once again 
set their sights on what they have missed28. 
  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence, 
(Georgetown University Press: 2008), pg. 3-4. 
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Chapter 2: The Origin of Insider Threats  
There are many different reasons why people become insider threats. Often, it is 
because of a disenchantment with the government. In other cases, it is because they become 
trapped in (or even blackmailed into) a series of bad decisions and see traitorous activity as 
the only way out29. Whatever reasons people have for betraying their country, understanding 
why once good citizens go down these alternate paths is important to determining how to 
counter them. In fact, the ideal situation would be to reach these individuals before they 
begin the path toward betrayal30.  
Although there are several explanations for the changes in psyche of the insider 
threat, there are two distinct models for understanding insider threat psychology, the Spy 
Lifecycle and the Radicalization Model31. These are good starting points for describing the 
shift in the thought process that leads loyal human beings to become attackers and spies. The 
most important aspect of these models, and something that is necessary to understand them, 
is how they define insider threat psychology. 
It is human nature to have predispositions. These are our personal habits that may 
make us susceptible to negative influences. In the case of insider threats, these influences 
may be Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS) and International Terrorist 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Some additional reasons are personal greed, exacting revenge, coercion and compromise, ego and excitement, 
and many more. One important note, approximately 65 percent of all insiders come from within the native born 
population, leaving 35 percent as naturalized citizens. 
 
30 This will be one of the key recommendations for Chapter 4. 
 
31 The Radicalization Model is used to show the Radicalization Process and the turning of a violent insider. The 
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Organizations (ITO). The goal of these groups is to discover character flaws in people of 
potential interest and exploit them. In identifying a potential insider threat, FISS and ITO 
search for people with the right predispositions and enough weaknesses or outright problems 
to make them vulnerable. These vulnerabilities can help our enemies to harness any political 
uncertainty, organizational dissent, dual loyalty, or character flaws to manipulate their 
target32. These flaws may be very obvious or not, but what everyone should be aware of is 
that there are a series of associated indicators that may reveal dispositions. The major 
predispositions can be broken down into four areas: loyalties and ties, social and professional 
problems, financial problems, and mental health disorders33.   
 Loyalties and ties refer to more than people placing their hands on their heart and 
saying the pledge of allegiance. Loyalties and ties refer to whom or what they owe their 
loyalty, to what degree they believe in their country and its government, and what can test or 
even break their loyalty. Since 1990, insider espionage threats have indicated that over 58 
percent of insider spies had foreign relatives and friends overseas and 50 percent had foreign 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Richard J. Heuer, “The Insider Espionage Threat”, Research on Mitigating the Insider Threats to Information 
Systems, RAND Corporation, Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2000. 
 
33 The current way of looking at insider threats is as a series of indicators that may show if a person is a 
potential insider threat, but there are no means of associating the indicators.  By breaking down the indicators 
and giving them a larger predisposition, I am illuminating the main problem. Coworkers may not feel that their 
colleague is committing espionage, but they may realize he has work problems. Helping get past the initial 
denial of “They would never do that” can help others to realize just what actual issues might be at stake and 
may help prevent problems from developing into insider threats. This idea will be discussed about more in 
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professional connections34. This illustrates just how vulnerable those individuals were to 
influence and exploitation by our adversaries.  
One of the most easily exploitable weaknesses is a person’s loyalties. Everybody is 
born into a family, tribe, state, or country, with each of these different groups giving a person 
their individual identity. Often, people are born with a loyalty to many of those groups at the 
same time. In such cases, people are said to have dual loyalties. Dual loyalties are not 
uncommon and many people have them35. The exploitable weakness here occurs when FISS 
and ITO challenge these dual loyalties and split a person’s allegiances. The split of an insider 
threat’s loyalties leaves them owing allegiance to another state, group, or country. It is this 
“divided loyalty” that leaves insiders willing to harm their fellow citizens36. Divided loyalties 
are a real problem and account for 57 percent of all insider espionage threats37. As for violent 
insider threats, anyone that would conduct an attack in the name of an ITO displays 
symptoms of a divided loyalty, perhaps not for another country, but to the ITO.  
It is extremely difficult to identify someone with divided loyalties due to the often-
secretive nature of the division, or the inability to decipher a divided and dual loyalty. Some 
of the best indicators of potential divided loyalties include subversive language, expressed 
desire to harm fellow citizens, sending money and support overseas, and advocating loyalty 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Katherine L. Herbig, “Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007”, Defense Personal Security Research 
Center, Technical Report 08-05, March 2008. 
 
35 Herbig, Changes in Espionage. 
 
36 Heuer, The Insider Espionage Threat. 
 
37 Herbig, Changes in Espionage. 
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to a foreign interest38. While on paper these may seem ease to identify, they are difficult to 
see. The difficulty in identifying these indicators is what makes the second part of this 
predisposition so important. Cultural ties play a vital role in identifying what a person’s true 
loyalties are. 
 As previously stated, it may not be easy to identify someone’s loyalties at first glance. 
Keeping that in mind, individuals with foreign and cultural ties may be susceptible to FISS 
and ITO exploitation. Indicators of foreign and cultural ties include foreign friends and 
family, foreign assets, sudden religious conversion, donations overseas, and regular and 
unreported foreign travel39. The reason that these indicators could be signs of an insider 
threat is because they show ties to an outside country or ITO. These ties, which for many are 
innocuous, are to the insiders the crucial connection to the foreign nexus that drives their 
operations40. 
When one considers how an insider threat must have a foreign nexus, identifying 
foreign connections becomes paramount. For spies, foreign connections are difficult to 
identify because of the training they may have received. Additionally, often the only 
connection that they may have is a single “handler”41. Often, the support network that violent 
insiders have is nothing more than email correspondence overseas, and violent literature, like 
Inspire the official magazine of al-Qaeda, for violent extremists. Nidal Hassan, the Fort Hood 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Department of the Army. Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, (AR 381-12), October 2010. 
 
39 Department of the Navy. “Espionage Indicators.” NCIS Publications, March 2013. 
 
40 Department of the Army. AR 381-12. 
 
41 The liaison person between a spy and the foreign country they work for is known as the handler.  
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shooter, relied on email communications with Anwar Al-Awlaki, the operations head of Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for “guidance” before his attack42. At other times, 
communication can occur through individuals and spiritual leaders in the United States with 
connections overseas. Ryan Anderson, the Inland Island Jihad plotter, and the New York 
Synagogue plotter, James Cromitie, relied primarily on contacts they believed to be 
associated with ITOs43. Lastly, the support may be direct as with the cases of Faisal Shahzad, 
the failed Times Square bomber, and groups like the Lackawanna Six, in which the would-be 
attackers actually traveled overseas to Pakistan and Afghanistan where they were trained in 
terrorist tactics in hopes of attacking the US upon their return. No matter what the 
connections are, it often will be very difficult to see the foreign connections that some 
individuals have, which is why understanding the other predispositions is crucial.  
Poor decision-making ability, the second major predisposition, reveals the common 
exploitable weaknesses found in the decisions people make in everyday life. The decisions 
people make are what define how a person lives his or her life.  Poor decision-making can 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 CICENTRE, “DOMESTIC TERRORISM CASE: Nidal Malik Hasan”, http://www. 
cicentre.com/?HASAN_Nidal,15 February 2014. 
 
43 Ryan Anderson attempted to give secrets to AQ on how to destroy American tanks and “kill American 
soldiers.” (CICENTRE. “DOMESTIC TERRORISM/ESPIONAGE CASE:  Ryan Anderson”, http://www.ci 
centre.com/?page=ANDERSON_Ryan, 15 February 2014). The Island Jihad Plotters were a group of 
individuals from California who attempted to reach out to AQ and Taliban before scheduling to travel to 
Afghanistan to conduct Jihad (CI CENTRE, “DOMESTIC TERRORISM CASE: Inland Empire Jihad Plot”,  
 
http://www. cicentre.com/?Inland_Empire, 15 February 2014). James Cromitie believed he was communicating 
with terrorists in Afghanistan who would help him attack Americans at synagogues in the Bronx (CICENTRE, 
“DOMESTIC TERRORISM CASE: James Cromitie”, http://www.cicentre.com/? CROMITIE_James, 15 
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often result in both social and professional problems. Together, these illustrate the effects of 
poor decision-making and help us to understand how some people become insider threats44. 
Social problems can hinder people in making good decisions in their personal lives, 
specifically outside of the office and away from work. A few examples of common social 
problems and indicators associated with insider threats are gambling, drug and alcohol abuse, 
and adultery45. The reason that these behaviors can be indicators of espionage is because they 
leave the individual vulnerable. As with any bad behavior, there are always consequences. 
People who lack the ability to make wise decisions leave themselves open to the efforts of 
FISS and ITOs who may try to blackmail them based on the knowledge of their bad 
decisions. In an effort to protect themselves, some people may become vulnerable to 
recruitment. Also, social problems are an indicator that people may have internal conflicts in 
their lives that lead them to make these decisions. Drugs and alcohol, which are well-known 
coping mechanisms, may be what the person needs to deal with the stress of living a double 
life46. Lastly, these social problems often result in debt.47 The need for money may be what 
the person needs to agree to engage in active spying or attacks48. 
Professional problems are those that involve decisions and actions made in people’s 
professional lives, while working. There are two main types of professional problems: 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Steven R Band, Dawn Cappelli, Lynn F. Fischer, Andrew P. Moore, Eric D. Shaw, and Randall F. Trzeciak 
“Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis” CERT Program, December 2006. 
 
45 Department of the Army 381-12. 
 
46 The Spy Lifecycle shows how insiders may feel lost, isolated, and alone which leads them feeling inadequate. 
For some people, the only way to deal with these feelings is through alcohol and drugs. 
 
47 Herbig, Changes in Espionage 
 
48 Discussed more in depth later on in Chapter 2. 
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unprofessional behavior and breaches in security. Together, they demonstrate common issues 
that are exhibited in the workplace, where, due to the nature of the threat, a large percentage 
of insiders are actively operating49. 
Unprofessional behavior shows the value that people place in their work and the poor 
decisions they make when interacting with others. The insider-threat indicators associated 
with unprofessional behaviors include fighting with coworkers and expressed violent intent50. 
Those who fight coworkers and express violent intent show clearly that they do not fear 
harming others and they maintain negative animosities towards their work. It is this 
disgruntled attitude that FISS and ITOs can seize upon as a motive to swing potential 
insiders. Statistically, this is a huge problem since 97% of insider threats came to the 
attention of their supervisors because employees displayed symptoms of unprofessional 
behaviors; 58% indicated intent to cause harm and 20% directly threatened to harm others51. 
The good news is that with such a common indicator, this should provide one of the better 
tools for understanding and identifying threats.  
Lastly, operational security violations are important because 100 percent of insiders 
commit security violations. Whether it is soliciting information from others, attempting to 
gain access to information outside of their need-to-know, or copying and stealing classified 
information, all insiders commit security violations52. Someone who routinely violates 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Herbig, Changes in Espionage.  
 
50 Department of the Army 381-12. 
 
51 Band, Comparing Insider IT. 
 
52 Department of the Army 381-12. 
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security protocols may become the perfect target for those looking to get past security 
measures when targeting America53. 
The third major predisposition is financial problems. During the Cold War, spying for 
money was the most common reason for espionage, but that is no longer true today. In the 
past 20 years, the number of people spying for money has dropped to approximately 7%. 
Money often is considered a contributing factor, but since 2000, there have only been a few 
cases where it was the sole reason for someone’s betrayal54. 
Money can be a problem because of how it seemingly makes the world go around. As 
was already discussed, poor decision-making can result in FISS and ITO offering to pay off 
debts, however, there are other reasons someone could be monetarily motivated. Some 
people with large credit card debts may be looking for some way to get free of debt. Other 
individuals simply want to have a lifestyle that is beyond their means and will do anything to 
get it. Monetary indicators of insider threats include paying off substantial debt and living 
beyond one’s means55. These could be signs of repayment for insider action. Whatever the 
reason, money will always remain a motive to some degree. 
 The last area is mental health. This is much rarer than the other two predispositions 
but is just as important. According to the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center 
(PERSEREC) study in 2008, of the then 11 cases of insider threats since September 11, 2001, 
four involved cases in which the subject exhibited mental health problems. Such a weakness 
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is definitely a contributing factor to how FISS and ITO recruit insiders56. Those with access 
to information who have mental health problems could be turned against their country either 
wittingly or unwittingly with very little say otherwise.  
 The important thing to realize about predispositions is that everyone has them; human 
beings are not without fault. The mere presence of negative indicators does not necessarily 
mean that someone is an insider threat. What it does mean, though, is that while these ties 
alone may not be indicators, the negative behavior could develop into the slight hold that 
FISS and ITO’s need to develop an insider. The ways in which these weaknesses are 
exploited are what make up the Spy Lifecycle and the Radicalization Model. As stated 
previously, these models are the potential paths that people can go down that lead to their 
development as insiders. 
The Radicalization Model depicts the development that violent insider threats go 
through on their pathway to violent attacks. The Spy Lifecycle model displays the common 
thought processes that spies go through before deciding to hand over America’s secrets. 
These two models serve as excellent guides for explaining the psychology of their   piece of 
the insider threat, and together they show many similarities that can lead to better 
understanding of both spies and violent attackers.  
The Radicalization Model is that of the violent extremist. This model shows the 
thought process and the step-by-step contortion of thought that occurs in those who go from 
being a normal person to disgruntled insider to violent killer. This model was first “created” 
by an independent study in the New York Police Department. Prior to that, the Radicalization 
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Model was merely a loosely grouped set of indicators that suggested terrorist activity. The 
NYPD identified the psychological path that extremist Muslims take. This study was based 
on case studies of past terrorists. While considered to be the definitive “process of 
radicalization,” it looks strictly at radicalization from the standpoint of Takfiri Muslims57. 
This paper will look at the Radicalization Model a little differently and incorporate multiple 
views of it, tying in additional insights from those who do not necessarily agree with it58. One 
key distinction to make is that radicalization is not limited to Muslims alone. This paper will 
break the model down into four phases: Pre-Radicalization, Indoctrination, Planning, and 
Action. 
During the Pre-Radicalization phase, the future insider threat is living a normal life. 
They usually have “ordinary jobs” and live normal lives. During this phase of their life, they 
will go to school, have families, and perhaps go to church. Their life is no different than 
many of those in the world today59. 
The second phase, identification, usually involves the first signs of stress. This is 
where the individual begins to feel the pressures of the outside world more clearly. Perhaps 
there are people at work who harass him daily, or perhaps the reforms of the government go 
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Qaeda (the reports intended model) is a follower of the Takfiri ideas. Takfiri Muslims split away from the 
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against his religious convictions60. These triggers make the individual begin to feel dissent61. 
This dissent starts out small, perhaps as a simple disagreement or upset, but it grows. Soon, 
these disinterested individuals feel like they need someone that understands them. All too 
often, the people left to fill these shoes are members of ITOs. Leaders in these groups now 
begin to take the often young and malleable minds of their targets and lead them into 
thinking that if they killed just a few people, the government would see how wrong its 
policies are regarding a given issue62. Once the individual has reached out to others, the 
grooming is furthered, and the ITOs continue to mold and shape his picture of reality. Their 
reality is shaped by “cliques” which “define a certain social reality for the ever more intimate 
friends, and facilitates the development of a shared collective social identity and strong 
emotional feelings for the group63.” The end of this phase is marked by the complete 
transference of thought from the possibility that some people should die to efforts to get the 
disaffected person to conduct an attack. The most important part of this phase involves the 
signs explored in the first part of this chapter. Due to the emergent nature of these extremist 
beliefs, the individual will show the most indicators including, but not limited to, expressing 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Tomas Precht, “Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe”, Danish Ministry of Justice, 
Dec. 2007. 
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Political (global conflict), personal (death in family). 
 
62 Silber & Bhatt, Radicalization. 
 
63 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K., FDD Center for 
Terrorism and Research, April 2009. (Quote from Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 
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hatred towards American society and culture, advocating support for ITOs, advocating 
violence to achieve goals, or communicating with and funding extremist organizations64. 
The third phase, indoctrination, is the planning phase. During this phase of 
Radicalization, the insider is beginning to purchase the necessary items for conducting the 
attack. At this point, he has already decided that he is going to kill Americans.  All he needs 
are the supplies and the location. During this phase, there are fewer indicators visible to the 
outside. Some will be plain to see, including buying weapons, buying bomb-making 
materials, traveling to a training camp, target selection and reconnaissance, and final 
construction of a bomb65. 
The fourth and final stage is the action phase. During this phase, the insider finally 
launches an attack. By the time the insider has made it to this phase of the cycle, the hope of 
preventing the attack is very limited and the only indicator left is the attack itself. 
Together these four steps take a seemingly normal individual and transform him into 
a homegrown terrorist. The process is slow and often does not happen overnight, but that is 
one of the things that makes identification so difficult. Each of the steps along the way has 
several indicators during which outside forces can attempt to change the course of that 
individual’s life. If those steps are not altered, then it is a victory for the enemy. 
The second model that breaks down the psychology of the insider threat is the Spy 
Lifecycle. This model shows that there are commonalities between the different thought 
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processes that many spies go thru before deciding to hand over their secrets. The complete 
Spy Lifecycle, as created by Dr. David Charney, was developed through an in-depth 
investigation of case studies and psychological interviews with convicted spies. The model 
itself follows the life of a spy from his pre-spying days thru the “brooding in jail” phase66. 
This paper will only look at the phases up to active spying because that is what helps develop 
the psychological mindset of the insider spy. These thought processes are just as twisted as 
those of the Radicalization Model and the results can be just as deadly. 
The first phase of the Spy Lifecycle is the sensitizing stage. During this phase, the 
future insider spy is growing up. The insider will live a seemingly normal life, but usually 
there are influences that will mentally scar him, perhaps an absentee or abusive parent, 
maybe a failed love life, or even a troubled childhood as the son of immigrants. For most, 
these influences will be simply a memory; for the insider spy they often play a much deeper 
role in defining who they are and remain on their mind forever67. Typically, the only 
indicators that would manifest themselves at this point are individual flaws and weaknesses. 
The second stage, the stress and spiral stage, is characterized by more life challenges. 
The challenges experienced in this phase are not the same as the ones the person experienced 
growing up.  Perhaps the insider loses a child or spouse during birth, maybe his spouse is 
cheating on him, or maybe he even begins to have problems with people in the office based 
on race or ethnic background. Regardless, the effects of this stage will stress the insider to the 
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highest degree68. This phase is marked by a change in behavior of the insider. Like the first 
phase, the only indicators that would manifest themselves at this point are the individual’s 
character flaws and weaknesses. 
The third phase, known as the crisis and resolution phase, occurs when the insider just 
cannot take the stress anymore. The external problems of life are affecting his work and 
family life; perhaps he is getting negative reviews at work and maybe his wife has left him. 
The stress felt at this point is at its worst. Many people turn to alcohol and drugs to cope with 
the problems, but this leads to discipline problems at work. Full of upset and anger, the 
insider begins to pass blame for his problems to the organization where he works. He begins 
to think about how he might get “payback.” Slowly, during this phase, it becomes evident 
that the insider is changing. The insider will look for acceptance and support wherever he can 
find it. Perhaps he finds a group of people from the land of his parents who offer to help him 
out. It is the last part of this phase when he decides maybe he can alleviate his problems by 
spying that he will spy for money and with enough money everything will be alright69. This 
phase is characterized by serious personal and professional problems in the life of the insider. 
These problems may not always be visible since many individuals are good at 
compartmentalizing their lives so that they do not outwardly show their true emotions. This 
might be when the decision-making problems, both social and professional, manifest 
themselves most clearly with a possible a turn to drugs and alcohol70. 
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The final stage that this paper will look at is the post-recruitment (or volunteer) phase. 
The Spy Lifecycle does not end there; it actually consists of six more phases that cover 
regrets, denial, dormancy, acceptance of fate, arrest, and jail time. These phases though do 
not add anything of value to the understanding of the insider spy and his earliest thought 
process. During this fourth phase of the cycle, the insider spy is actively conducting his 
espionage. The money is coming in and the information is flowing. During this phase, the 
most significant indicators of espionage will be visible because the spy is actively conducting 
espionage71. This phase will often be characterized by new foreign contacts and travel, 
disregard for security, unusual work behavior and undue interest in sensitive or classified 
projects, and financial relief and living beyond one’s means. These common indicators of 
espionage will most likely be visible, although identifying them now only helps to catch the 
active spy, not prevent the damage he does to national security72. 
 These models each show a twisted pathway that leads to betrayal, but the most 
important thing to note is the similarities that exist between the models. While models 
attempt to take data and find a common ground, as pointed out in NAIC’s report, models do 
not show a guaranteed path. Nonetheless, it is important to look at the “models” because 
while 9 times out of 10 the person that exhibits these habits will not develop into an insider 
threat, there is the potential. What this chapter has shown thus far is that there are many 
different behavioral weaknesses that leave individuals susceptible to exploitation by FISS 
and ITOs. The exploitation of these individuals can lead them down a pathway towards 
betrayal. Once someone is on this path, it does not mean they will become an insider. There 
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is still time for intervention. The further down the path they go, the less intervention is 
possible, and the less influence it will have. 
 Together, each of these models provides a good insight as to how insiders betray, but 
what do they have in common? The answer, remarkably, is that they have a great deal in 
common. The crimes may be different, but the psychological thought processes are very 
similar. 
 The first commonality is that during the first stage of both models the insider lives a 
seemingly normal life.  There are ups and downs, but nothing is too far out of the ordinary. 
The spy may have additional stressors early in life, but otherwise the early stages are quite 
similar. This first stage simply underscores that as similar as the two types of potential 
insiders are at this point, they are not much different than the rest of people in their society. 
What really sets them apart is how they handle their problems. During the second stage of 
both models, we begin to see the indicators that point towards a shift in psychology. The 
stresses on the individual increase, and in the radicalization model, at least, the perceived or 
real persecution is just too much and the thought process goes from “I dislike the people” to 
“I want to work with others to hurt them.” This is the same as the thought process for the spy 
in the third stage, where the answer to his problems seems to be in the infliction of damage to 
those that he once called his countrymen. The final similarity is that for the Radicalization 
Model, the third and fourth phases are about prepping for the attack and attacking. Phase four 
for the spy is when all the activity occurs.  
 All the models are very similar and they cast a new way of analyzing insider threats. 
They are not scientific and they are not fact. What they are is an attempt to explain a strange 
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and unknown psychology. Understanding why insiders become insiders is critical because 
the psychology of their behavior is what helps those who study them to understand the 
threat73. Without understanding the threat, there is no way that one can hope to defeat it. The 
great advances in the last 13 years, since September 11, 2001, show just how much the 
Intelligence Community has applied its collective efforts to understanding the insider threat. 
This new understanding of basic psychology indicates that the IC is adapting well to the 
changing threats. The only thing left to do now is to begin incorporating this understanding 
into regular training and defense mechanisms. 
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Chapter 3: The Current CI Community and Approaches to Insider Threats  
A threat as atypical as that posed by an insider presents a certain challenge for any 
defense plan. Ultimately, insider threats find their roots in spying and sabotage, two activities 
already addressed as being as old as organized states and best handled by 
Counterintelligence. Defeating these two types of attacks has required a special plan, 
organized and designed to target threats from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels74.  
The terms strategic, operational, and tactical are words primarily used to describe 
levels of decision making in the military during war. Given the ongoing fight against 
insiders, and the danger posed by them, military terms in this sense are appropriate to define 
the “battle plans” necessary for the fight. The strategic level resides at the national level 
where policymakers make decisions that affect long-term national goals and strategies. This 
would be where strategy is crafted and where battle plans are developed for all of the 
different threats that the people and their government face. The operational level refers to 
different “theaters of war” for the fight and the different organizations that operate in each. 
At this level, different organizations have specific goals driven by the larger strategy in the 
fight against the common threat. Finally, there is the tactical level, where the CI 
“engagements” and “battles” are fought. At this level, individual “combatants” such as field 
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agents and analysts do their part to produce success in the larger struggle75. Using this 
framework, the United States has responded to the insider threat in much the same way that 
the US government responds to other threats.  
At the strategic level, insider threats are under the purview of the Intelligence 
Community (IC)76. More specifically, when it comes to solving problems, often the best 
method is to target those enemies who, according to intelligence sources, would target us. 
That is what Counterintelligence seeks to do. Agents seek to exploit the weaknesses of those 
who target them to gain knowledge on the very mechanisms that their enemies are hoping to 
use to harm Americans. Once this objective has been met, CI is left to exploit its captured 
and compromised sources for actionable intelligence. This type of operation does many 
things for the Intelligence Community. It not only stops the threat, but it exploits the 
extensive network setup to support the insider and it gets inside the enemy’s state of mind to 
illuminate how he thinks and operates, what his tools are, and what his weaknesses are77. As 
previously stated, the IC is tasked with collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence, but 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. “Three Levels of War.” Air and Space 
Power Mentoring Guide, (Vol. 1, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997). 
76	  The	  IC	  is	  composed	  of	  17	  different	  agencies	  whose	  duty	  it	  is	  to	  collect,	  analyze,	  and	  distribute	  
intelligence	  products	  to	  policymakers	  in	  Washington.	  In	  charge	  of	  the	  IC	  is	  the	  Director	  of	  National	  
Intelligence	  (DNI).	  The	  DNI	  is	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  directing	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Community	  and	  
ensuring	  a	  unity	  of	  effort.	  The	  IC	  operates	  in	  a	  system	  following	  a	  basic	  cycle.	  The	  easiest	  way	  to	  interpret	  
the	  Intelligence	  Cycle	  is	  to	  look	  at	  it	  as	  a	  loop	  in	  which	  information	  enters	  the	  system,	  moves	  through	  the	  
cycle,	  and	  eventually	  releases	  new	  information,	  starting	  the	  loop	  over	  again.	  Kent	  argues	  that	  the	  
intelligence	  process	  is	  a	  cycle	  in	  which	  intelligence,	  as	  a	  product,	  is	  consumed	  by	  policymakers,	  who	  give	  
feedback	  to	  the	  Intelligence	  Community	  for	  future	  collection	  and	  direction.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  very	  simplified	  
definition,	  it	  captures	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  the	  process.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  feedback	  loop	  implies	  
that	  guidance	  is	  given	  in	  the	  beginning,	  and	  again	  at	  the	  end	  to	  keep	  the	  cycle	  going.	  Since	  the	  mission	  of	  
the	  IC	  is	  to	  provide	  intelligence	  for	  the	  policy	  maker,	  it	  is	  the	  policy	  community’s	  role	  to	  provide	  the	  
guidance	  on	  where	  to	  collect	  intelligence.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Insider	  Threat,	  the	  threat	  has	  always	  been	  
present,	  but	  often	  policy	  has	  been	  more	  focused	  on	  other	  threats.	  (Mark	  M.	  Lowenthal,	  Intelligence:	  From	  
Secrets	  to	  Policy,	  (4th	  ed.,	  CQ	  Press,	  Washington	  DC	  2009)).	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CI is responsible for a very special aspect, the enemy’s perspective. For CI, the idea that the 
best defense is a good offense against insider threats reigns supreme. In this sense, the key is 
exploitation. By exploiting insider threats, we can begin to establish what FISS and ITO 
structures look like in the United States, which ultimately supports the end goal of force 
protection, and stopping the insider threat. For instance, had we understood fully the 
connection between Anwar Awlaki and Nidal Hassan prior to the Fort Hood shooting, what 
are the chances the Texas massacre could have been prevented78? That is what the mission is 
about—protection—and it has evolved through the years to make Counterintelligence what it 
is today. 
At the strategic level, the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is tasked 
with providing leadership, prioritization, and guidance of the IC’s CI organizations. This 
guidance extends to all matters of CI from operations to collections79. Each of the agencies in 
the IC and CI Community has an important part to play in countering the insider threat, but 
the CI Community as a whole is what establishes the common operating picture and provides 
a unity of effort when it comes to countering the insider threat at the operational and tactical 
levels.  
At the operational level within the Intelligence Community, there are nearly a dozen 
different organizations that conduct Counterintelligence. The United States Army has US 
Army Counterintelligence, the Navy has the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), 
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the Air Force has the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), and there are even CI elements 
in the Departments of State, Energy, and Justice. This vast array of Counterintelligence 
bodies means that there are many different entities each led by different parent organizations, 
and each with different priorities. Providing the unity of effort to lead these groups is a 
struggle for the NCIX and one that often conflicts with higher-level goals. The reason for 
these difficulties is that each of the different organizations in the Counterintelligence 
Community has a specific goal and purpose. Two examples of these differences are the 
Department of State and the Department of Energy. In the State Department, 
counterintelligence agents are worried about threats to diplomatic missions80. Meanwhile, in 
the Department of Energy, agents are focused on the threat to Nuclear Technology81. Each 
agency is concerned with its own most-serious insider threats and has long had systems in 
place to counter the insider threat as its analysts see them. 
Finally, at the tactical level, individual agents for the different organizations are on 
the streets daily, confronting the threat, and catching the “bad guys.” This final level, 
however, is not just agents.  It also includes the general public. Due to the threat posed by 
insiders, the person best suited to catch insider threats before or during their acts is the person 
sitting to their right or left, their friends, coworkers, or neighbors. Because an insider by 
definition is no different in appearance than any other person, a knowledge and 
understanding of the threats, by the general population, is very important. Countering this 
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threat is not one where the agents can do all of the work. Every person must do his or her part 
to help. 
Assigning Counterintelligence assets the primary responsibility for countering insider 
threats, as the 2009 National Strategy did, focuses their collection, analysis, and 
dissemination efforts against those targets that seek to exploit America’s weaknesses82. 
Understanding this mission and its importance, the CI Community has adapted substantially 
over the years to meet the evolving threats. The current CI Community is largely reflective of 
the necessity for organization and standardization when it comes to handling insider threats. 
The changes of the past 20 years are some of the most important in the fight against insider 
threats and are what define the current CI Community’s structure and strategy.  
In 1994, the first extensive reforms to the Counterintelligence Community came 
about in response to the arrest and subsequent conviction of Aldrich Ames of espionage. 
Ames was convicted in 1994 of having spied for the Soviet Union for nearly nine years. 
Considered the deadliest spy in American history, Ames handed over 25 American spies, two 
of the most productive collections programs, and nearly 100 other operations that were the 
crown jewels of the American intelligence effort against the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War83. The reason that Ames got away with spying was not because he was a great spy. 
Ames was, in fact, quite the opposite. The reason that Ames got away with it was because the 
Counterintelligence system had shortcomings. These problems, identified in great detail by 
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the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence, brought to light systemic errors in how CI in 
the CIA and FBI shared information, conducted investigations, and cooperated when it came 
to handling potential insiders84. Additionally, lackadaisical security practices at the 
operational level allowed Ames to commit what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
called “the most egregious level of espionage ever seen85.” 
Based on its assessment of these errors, Congress passed the National 
Counterintelligence Reform Act of 1994. This law was designed to change the institutional 
errors outlined by the Senate Select Committee and create a structure that would promote a 
more unified Counterintelligence Community. The key aspect of this law was the creation of 
the National Counterintelligence Center (NCIC). The NCIC was designed to develop a 
national counterintelligence policy and create a national program for counteracting foreign 
threats86. The problem was that it did not do this. The NCIC did not present unified national 
policy that was capable of “unifying” the different Counterintelligence offices. Thus, the 
institutional problems that should have been fixed following the Ames case continued, 
allowing Robert Hanssen, who began spying even before Ames, to continue his activities 
until February of 2001. 
 As with all such failures, following the conviction of Robert Hanssen, policy makers 
again directed “fixes” to the Counterintelligence Community. In 2002, Congress passed the 
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Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, which brought about the creation of the 
NCIX, and the National Counterintelligence Policy Board87. Together, these two 
organizations were tasked with tying the community together and providing guidance, 
leadership, and oversight in US Counterintelligence. The NCIX would accomplish this 
mission by producing the annual National Counterintelligence Strategy88. This strategy, 
which would set forth priorities for the community, would be based on information from the 
National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA)89. However, this was 
not enough. More changes were needed as was highlighted in 2005 when the Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
said that US Counterintelligence was “fractured, myopic, and only marginally effective90.” 
This understanding would lead to further changes and improvements in the NCIX and in US 
Counterintelligence; the change that was needed was to address insider threats specifically. 
One of the key tenets with regards to the establishment of the NCIX was the ability to 
standardize the approach taken by myriad CI organizations to counter the “insider threat.” 
The answer to this problem would come in 2009 with the newly created Insider Threat 
Advisory Group (ITAG) and, in 2011, with the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF). 
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These two organizations would help draft policy, implement standards, and continuously 
assess the implementation of a National Insider Threat Policy. 
The ITAG was established in the 2009 National Counterintelligence Strategy. The 
role, as laid out in that strategy, was to define, the organizations that counter insider threats, 
the “best practices” from these organizations, and make a uniform policy from which to 
counter insider threats91. Despite the ITAG’s very vague role, Gene Barlow, of the NCIX 
office, clarified the ITAG’s purpose stating that it would be a committee composed of 
members from across the IC that meets to create a unified policy, derived from the successes 
(or best practices) of other organizations, for defeating insider threats92. All organizations in 
the IC would have a role to play by contributing their best practices, and eventually adapting 
to future recommendations proposed by the ITAG. Additionally, the ITAG recommended 
creating another organization to help with the implementation and standardization of the new 
policy. This new organization would be the National Insider Threat Task Force93.  
Following the formation of the ITAG, in 2011, President Barack Obama released 
Executive Order 13587, “Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks 
and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information94.” This executive 
order incorporated the initial assessments of the ITAG, officially created the NITTF, and 
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established a timeline for publishing the National Policy. The role of the NITTF, as described 
in EO 13587, was to finish the development of the National Insider Threat Policy and to 
ensure its implementation within one year95. 
The NITTF continues to this day to undergo refinement. According to George 
Stukenbracker, the co-director of the NITTF, its current mission is to outline the National 
Policy for training, establish minimum standards for insider threat programs, conduct 
command inspections of insider threat programs to ensure compliance, recommend 
improvements to organizational insider threat programs, and give country-specific threat 
briefs for the IC96. This mission gives them the unique ability to conduct oversight across the 
CI Community and continually realign the community’s approach to insider threats. 
Comprised of officials from across the community, the NITTF will be able to provide new 
perspectives that CI specialists in the Department of Defense, Justice, or State may not see 
based on their institutional mission. 
The creation of the NITTF was one of the biggest changes in the CI Community 
during the past 20 years and is already beginning to show signs of success. The group’s 
formation, and drafting, of a National Insider Threat Policy is a huge step from previous 
organizations, which were “formed,” but never did anything. This new National Policy will 
sync all of the different CI organizations and ensure a united message across the community 
designed at targeting the tactical-level decision makers. What this does, effectively, is turn all 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ibid. 
 
96 George Stukenbracker, Co-director of the NITTF, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Indirect Interview 





44	   	  
those who work in the IC into “sensors” for insider threats. Secondly, by requiring that 
training match a national standard, all IC personnel will receive consistency of training 
objectives and a standard message across the IC. The result of this has been crucial, increased 
reporting, and increased sensitivity to potential threats. Additionally, the creation of the 
NITTF has led to the drafting of new organizational-level training standards and policies in 
many CI organizations97. One example is the Army. The old “insider threat” manual, AR 
381-12: Subversions and Espionage Directed Against the United States Army, has since been 
re-written. The new AR 381-12: Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, written in 2010, 
was very important because it began to incorporate protection against terrorist and extremist 
organizations, something the older document did not address98. 
The last and largest NITTF benefit to the IC is a new collection of country threat 
briefings and threat analyses they produce. These briefings will be created by the NITTF and 
used as apart of regular threat briefings to IC personnel traveling outside the United States. 
The analysis will be conducted by IC analysts and given from the NITTF to IC agencies 
regularly to ensure that there is a clear, coherent, and current threat analysis for every country 
in the world. These provide government agencies a general CI threat picture. This 
information is important because it gives leaders in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or one of the 
17 intelligence agencies information on threats that will be seen by all organizations. This is 
a good starting point for deeper analysis by the CI Community on their mission-specific 
threats. By forcing the CI Community to operate together and create unified policies, 
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different perspectives of CI will drive future changes. Continual adaptation means increased 
awareness of and sensitivity to emerging threats, which in turn equates to greater success.  
 The Counterintelligence Community has come a long way from its beginnings. It has 
changed and adapted over the years to meet the challenges it has faced. The NITTF and the 
ITAG are very useful additions to the CI Community, but will they accomplish their goals? 
The unified policy now in its second year is already making strides to fix problems, but there 
are still changes to be made. These will not be easy, as is the case with most reform, whether 
it is with the Intelligence Community as a whole or just the CI Community. 
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Chapter 4: The Reform Process 
Given the many insider threat-related challenges the CI Community faces, the United 
States has done a great deal to confront this dangerous enemy. Nonetheless, the CI 
Community must make additional changes due to weaknesses in the current legislative 
processes, organizational interactions, and other issues involved in this effort 99. As addressed 
in Chapter 3, the structure of the CI Community has adapted over the years, but the sad 
reality is that these changes happened largely as a result of failures in the system and knee-
jerk reactions designed to address specific instances of failure100. Even then, the changes that 
do occur often do not come easily and are the result of extensive reform processes throughout 
the IC. The ever-present threat posed by insiders means that the US CI Community must 
routinely evaluate the process it operates under and look to better itself. Our CI specialists 
must address a range of persistent vulnerabilities to help strengthen the American security 
apparatus. The problem is that substantive reform is often very difficult to accomplish in the 
IC, and subsequently the CI Community, for two reasons. First, intelligence reform is usually 
more politically motivated than it is focused on, and motivated by, the need for substantive 
change101. Second, since the IC is a tool of the policy makers, who ultimately oversee these 
organizations, this often means that the people making decisions for the IC have little to no 
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real understanding of the Intelligence process102. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, there were 
multiple reforms over the past 20 years that have helped mold the CI Community into an 
organization that could fight the insider threat. These changes however, were not the result of 
planned reform, they were reactionary movements to larger community failures that allowed 
insiders like Ames, Hanssen, and Hassan to exist. Politicians do not like huge failures for 
political reasons, so large high-profile events act as ”motivation” for change, and to show 
their constituents that they are making things better103. 
Policymakers drive the intelligence cycle. As the driving force, they should 
continually evaluate the systems in place, judging their effectiveness and adapting them as 
need be104. Unfortunately, this is often not the priority of those in the policy community105. 
The absolute certainty of the need for reforms in the CI Community begs the question, why 
have major substantive reforms not happened yet106? The answer to this question relates to 
the challenges that intelligence reform faces: time, concession of power, and consensus. 
Time is a valuable commodity and one that has a dramatic impact on the actions of 
people everywhere. Whether it is rushing to meet a deadline or hanging on for the long run, 
time seems to dictate our lives, and this idea could not be truer for both the IC and the policy 
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community. The reason that time is such a significant challenge to reform has to do with the 
nature of the IC and CI communities, the policy community, and the dramatically different 
understandings they have of time. 
First, in the IC there has traditionally been less sense of time-urgency, because before 
9/11 intelligence was seen mostly as a long-run game, an endurance race.  The challenges 
posed by agile extremist organizations have forced the IC to face a new paradigm in this 
arena.  However, when it comes to collecting, analyzing, and exploiting so much information 
from the enemy, whether that is an insider threat, a nation-state he spies for, or an ITO 
supporting him, the operations tend to last for years. As intelligence professionals see it, 
steady analysis not rushed by political pressure is the key to success. Conversely, in Congress 
and the White House, politicians are rushed to make their mark by showing their constituents 
what they have accomplished.  In this sense, they often view intelligence as a tool to gain 
large results in a short period of time. With the two operating under a different time frame 
there are bound to be confrontations107. 
The second and most important way that time holds back reform is in the reform 
process itself. Given that reform will be drafted and incorporated by the policy community, 
the US Congress cannot simply “change.” Rather, there have to be bills written, voted on, 
debated, passed, and signed into law. This all takes time—a very long time. To make matters 
worse, it is the legislature’s right to conduct an investigation into failures, or reasons for 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World. (Roxbury Publishing 
Company, Los Angeles, 2004), pg. 222. 
 
	  
49	   	  
reform108.  As Berkowitz states, “Commissions take months to convene, staff, and complete 
their work. Experience shows that commissions require, on average, a year or two to report 
their results—and even more time to declassify their reports so they can be released for 
public discussion. During this time, any passion officials might have had for fixing 
intelligence ebbs and the public’s attention wanders to other matters.” Just one example of 
this is the September 11th Commission, which was formed a year after the attacks, releasing 
results two years later, and passing changes through Congress 10 months later109. The 
problem here is that the IC has its most fervent reform supporters immediately after the 
failure, as was the case with Ames, Hanssen, and Manning, yet as time drags on, the 
supporters of reform begin to become busy with other things, and the intended reforms do not 
come to fruition110.  
The next major barrier to reform is cession of power, because giving up power is not 
what any agency, or leader, wants to do111. This desire to maintain power often results in 
nothing more than long debates and very weak results, if any at all. An example of this is 
clear within the IC.  In 2002, with the creation of the position of the NCIX, the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 tasked the NCIX with developing the annual 
National CI Strategy. Developing this strategy would be based on the NTIPA as stated in 
Chapter 3. The problem is that the NTIPA and the CI Strategy are not based on the Director 
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of National Intelligence’s National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), nor does the NIS say 
anything about CI112. This is because with the creation of the NCIX in 2002, it was given the 
power of drafting the CI Strategy, while the DNI, created in 2004, does not have the power to 
“develop” any part of the CI strategy. This is one area where a small cession of power and 
cooperation between organizations could go a long way to unifying the role that the DNI has 
within the IC113. This tight hold on the CI Community has had drastic consequences for the 
office of the DNI, which was originally designed to provide leadership and guidance for all 
of the IC, but left weak and limited. 
 Like time, consensus is a chief barrier to reform for the IC and policy community 
because of how the intelligence cycle works. However, consensus is probably the most 
important barrier because of the ways in which it can affect other barriers to reform. One of 
the key ways in which consensus is a challenge to reform has to do with the fact that 
consensus implies that both sides come to an agreement. As Berkowitz discusses, political 
compromise allows opponents to sabotage the creation of any new agency from the start by 
simply not agreeing to certain aspects of potential future laws114. This truly is a hurdle for 
reform because while politicians, and heads of agencies, can come with hands outstretched 
under the banner of reform, a “nay” vote or even language inserted into a bill that passes 
through the legislature can destroy consensus and weaken any real reforms. 
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 Another major barrier to consensus is the secret nature of the IC. The reality is that 
the majority of the work that the IC does is classified, which can be a problem for the policy 
community. The reason this level of secrecy is such a major issue is that members of the 
policy community do not normally have the clearance to see all the information necessary to 
make proper decisions about CI or any other reforms. This lack of information basically 
leaves the IC asking Congress to go along with their plans with a minimum amount of 
information and understanding of what the plans actually are115. In this way a call to reform 
without all the necessary components is not asking for consensus, but rather asking for 
acceptance by the few who have access to the intelligence, which in the case of the Senate is 
a Select Committee of 15 individuals and in the House, 21 individuals.  
 Finally, for the proper cession of power there must be consensus on the level of gains 
or losses, which can end up being a problem, especially for agencies or individuals not 
wishing to lose power. For example, when the office of the Director of National Intelligence 
was created, the policy makers and the Department of Defense never could gain consensus as 
to the level of power the DNI would have, and the result of this was a DNI with very little 
power116. 
 Ultimately, time, power struggles, and consensus will remain barriers to reform and 
until those barriers are overcome, the IC, the CI Community, and the policy community will 
continue to experience problems like those already seen. This continuing failure will waste 
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time and effort—time that is already in short supply and could be used to stop insiders 
instead of allowing them to continue damaging the United States. 
 In light of these challenges and the problems that still exist, we must evaluate the 
kinds of changes required for the continued fight against insider threats. As has been 
previously mentioned, this work focuses on reform efforts at the strategic level for three 
reasons. First, top-down reform is critical when it comes to addressing an enemy like the 
insider threat where a unified approach is needed. Second, reform suggestions for individual 
agencies look too deeply at specific tactics. Addressing weaknesses would have very real 
security implications due to the nature of the sensitivity of the mission. Finally, the sheer 
number of differences between the different operational agencies and their different mission 
sets would inundate researchers and not allow adequate analysis of weaknesses at any other 
level.  
 In order properly to look at each problem, this work will first define the problem 
within the CI Community that interested parties must address. Next, it will outline steps for 
proper implementation of the reforms. Inherent to this is how implementation will address 
the aforementioned barriers to reform. Lastly, for each reform effort this work will offer 
some evaluation criteria, which may be used to identify strengths/successes or weaknesses of 
the reform efforts.  
 Before presenting recommendations, understanding what type of reform is best for 
the IC is essential to ensuring the best changes. Sweeping reform efforts generally do not 
work. Often, in the effort to “fix problems” policy makers will make massive and 
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revolutionary changes117. These risk throwing out the good organizational structures, 
procedures, and systems in place along with the bad ones. The changes proposed in this work 
are intended to limit the “pendulum swings” that Richard Betts refers to, and to offer minor 
corrections that will benefit CI in its continued missions to stamp out insider threats118. 
 Lastly, one important issue to highlight for evaluation is that intelligence reform 
evaluations are difficult to assess due to the nature of intelligence. By definition, intelligence 
helps to inform. Good intelligence may help to inform leaders of decisions needed to prevent 
negative outcomes. In this case, decisions made will yield little to no “visible” result. 
However, when intelligence does not inform, and disaster occurs, policy makers will tend to 
say there was a failure in intelligence119. Failures are always visible, and the IC is almost 
always held accountable. The root of this problem rests in the fact that the only true success 
is 100-percent success120. The next time a spy is caught or a violent extremist blows himself 
and American citizens up, policy makers will begin looking at the system as a failure. The 
reason this is seen as a failure is because of the misunderstanding of what intelligence is and 
what it does. Intelligence is not predictive and it cannot catch 100 percent of the problems, 
especially when it comes to insider threats. As with all things in this world, everyone and 
everything has a say, to include our enemies, for every action that we take our enemies can 
be expected to take two. Knowing this, policy makers must understand that there will always 
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be uncertainty in intelligence and that “failure” is not necessarily failure there is always more 
that is accomplished that is never seen121. 
 The first improvement that is needed is the establishment of a common definition of 
an insider threat. Currently, there are over 15 different definitions as outlined in the NCIX’s 
Official Terms & Definitions of Interest List122. Such a broad list of definitions leaves many 
questions in the minds of the different IC agencies as to what an insider threat is, and who 
has jurisdiction regarding collection, analysis, and apprehension. Most importantly, the 
definition in the 2012 National Policy lacks any sort of tie to a foreign nexus123. This vague 
language creates confusion as to who has jurisdiction over potential insiders. According to 
the policy definition, CI would have been responsible for identifying and handling any threat, 
to include domestic law enforcement cases. The problem is that if these threats are American 
citizens, not working for extremist organizations or foreign nations, then CI does not have 
jurisdiction as assigned in EO 12333124. This current lack of specificity can cause confusion 
when it comes to handling insider threats, because over utilization of CI and LE on areas 
outside of their jurisdiction leaves them both over-exerted and stretched thin125. Furthermore, 
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establishing a definition will be difficult with as many different and divergent definitions as 
we already have throughout the government. As was mentioned, consensus is important and 
right now there is none. Changing this will require the NITTF to build common ground and 
push past the differences. The important thing to remember is that words have meanings and, 
as the 2009 NIS states, insider threats are the priority for CI126. An open-ended definition will 
tax a stressed organization. Specificity allows work to be spread across the spectrum of CI 
and Law Enforcement cases and thus increase the amount of success. 
 Chapter 1 of this paper outlined the author’s definition of an insider threat as “an 
individual with placement and access to critical infrastructures, military units, and the 
government and their supporting agencies who have allegedly turned against and targeted 
their parent organization, thus aiding a foreign power or international terrorist organization.” 
This definition is based on a conglomeration of multiple different definitions used across the 
IC. It encompasses all of the critical elements of the threat and leaves no question in the 
minds of the different agencies as to who has jurisdiction. Simply adopting a new definition 
does not mean that “jurisdiction battles” will be solved. Inherent to any definition is the 
constant need for cooperation amongst the different organizations of CI and in the case of 
uncertainty, to allow for joint investigations and the sharing of potentially valuable 
information between the different disciplines127. 
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 Evaluation will be more than just the success or failure of a standard definition. The 
definition itself will be tied to a broader evaluation of the National Threat Policy. 
Accordingly, the ITAG and the JITTF would be primarily responsible for the evaluation of 
current policies. In order to do this, an evaluation of classified and unclassified reporting and 
investigations, at the national level, will identify increases in reporting, opening of 
investigations, opening of joint investigations, prosecutions, and operations conducted. An 
increase in these numbers would be a strong indication that programs are working, at least in 
the short-term. This data would be compiled and presented by the NCIX to the DNI and 
policy makers as an indicator of the change that is occurring with new policies. Granted this 
information would not be shown to all policy makers, but there are representatives in 
Congress and the White House that would be privy to this information, and that serve as 
representatives for the broader policy community128. 
 The second improvement needed is that the CI Community should realign insider 
threat training to focus toward preventing threats, not simply identifying them. The National 
Insider Threat Policy includes a set of “Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider 
Threat Programs.” These minimum standards are the current guidelines promulgated by the 
executive branch, the NCIX, and the JITTF regarding Insider Threat Programs129. The 
programs’ standards have addressed many of the issues relating to insider threats except one 
key issue: prevention. The minimum standards read more like a list of training for 
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identification of a current threat, and less like a set of preventative measures. Identifying 
threats is useful, but the problem with insider threats is that they are often unidentifiable; 
more is needed in the form of prevention. The major problem with passing changes such as 
these is, once again, the problem of time. As previously stated, policy makers like to see fast 
results.  Preventative measures will not get nearly the same results as fast as identification. 
Focusing training on identification can give quantifiable numbers to policy makers about 
how successful a program has been by catching bad guys. One can hope that politics is not all 
that is at play when it comes to determining how these programs are organized, but these 
changes will need to be made quickly because the longer they wait the longer the system 
goes without preventative measures. 
 Not much needs to be added to current CI training, but an understanding of the basic 
threat psychology, as addressed in Chapter 2, should be a part of the Minimum Standards. A 
key element of this “preventative measure” is the provision of information regarding where 
developing threats can seek assistance, how coworkers can report suspected problems for 
assistance, and how supervisors can refer to assistance.  These insights would be crucial both 
for impacting the potential downward spiral and the apprehension of an individual. The one 
major outlet that exists is in Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs).  
 As stated in EO 12968, all individuals working for agencies with access to classified 
information are eligible to use EAPs for “assistance concerning issues that may affect their 
eligibility for access to classified information, such as financial matters, mental health, or 
substance abuse.” Essentially EAPs are counseling services for those in the IC who need an 
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extra support structure to get personal help130. The problem is that often there is a stigma 
placed on anyone for using these services. The proper use of these programs is crucial for 
serving this preventative measure and should be included in training as a healthy outlet free 
of judgment or damage to one’s career.  
 One thing that the Spy cycle and the Radicalization cycle both underscored was that 
in the earliest stages of the development of an insider threat, there was a need for help. The 
spy found that help in the solace of a foreign intelligence service, while the future violent 
extremist found it in the support network of an international terrorist organization. By 
focusing training on identification at the later stages of development, we are skipping an 
important step in the progression of an insider threat. Ignoring the early stages does nothing 
to prevent those potential future threats sitting on the edge of right and wrong from making 
bad choices. By adding to the current training a focus of earlier detection then the potential to 
remove the future insiders from their support structure and offer them a healthy outlet is 
possible. Additionally, teaching this training to everyone will turn personnel into sensors for 
future threats, not just current ones131.  
 The best way of evaluating change would be through the use of the individual 
agencies’ EAPs. These would continue to offer their counseling services as usual; nothing 
would change except for how they report the raw number of appointments and referrals each 
week. The visits, while confidential, would remain secret, but the number of meeting and 
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referrals would be reportable. These reports could be crucial to evaluating the effectiveness, 
results could be gleaned from: the amount of internal reporting, scheduled visits to EAPs, and 
new clients meeting with EAPs. This information would show an increase or decrease in 
what an EAP deems a “potential threat,” which then could be gathered and presented to 
policy makers as indicators of the effectiveness of programs and to illustrate the internal 
changes occurring because of new policies. 
 The third change is the NCIX and DNI should draft the National CI Strategy together 
and base priorities off the NIPF with the NTIPA serving as a supplement, not the primary 
factor. In 2002, Congress passed the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, which 
brought about the creation of the NCIX and the National Counterintelligence Policy 
Board132. Together, these two organizations were tasked with tying the community together 
and providing guidance, leadership, and oversight to US Counterintelligence despite not 
having actual control over the agencies and offices accomplishing the mission133. The NCIX 
manages to accomplish this by producing the annual National Counterintelligence 
Strategy134. This strategy, which draws priorities for the community, is based on information 
from the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA)135. The 
problem with this production system is that the NTIPA is drafted separately from the 
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National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)136. This is a problem because the NIPF is 
the DNI’s list of official priorities for the IC, drawn from policy maker, diplomatic, and 
defense priorities137. When the two documents are drafted separately, there is little to tie the 
two together, and the system will remain a disconnected and fractured bureaucratic mess. To 
complicate matters, the DNI, whose position was created in 2004, is tasked with providing 
priorities and guidance to the IC, yet based on the 2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement 
Act the DNI has no say on the priorities at play for the CI strategy. In essence, the DNI has 
no control over one of its own subordinate offices. The only control that the DNI does have is 
over the spending of the NCIX. However, since the NCIX does not have any budgetary 
control over the subordinate CI offices in the IC, this control is even limited138. This is a 
major challenge to cession of power, and one that is controlled by law. In order to change 
this, policy makers will have to become involved, and as mentioned earlier, time is never on 
the side of the reform process. 
 The NTIPA, while it has merit, needs to be more closely tied to the NIPF. Without 
this connection, the Intelligence Cycle is broken and CI elements are conducting their 
mission independent of their “consumers” needs. The problem with this as the Intelligence 
Cycle highlighted the role of intelligence as support the policy maker by providing the best 
information to make informed strategic decisions. By creating the National CI strategy in a 
vacuum from the NIPF the NCIX the oversight that is presented by policy makers in lost and 
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there are competing priorities within the IC, which result in lost effort139. To fix the problem, 
Congress will need to pass an amendment to the CI Enhancement Act of 2002 making the CI 
strategy the product of the NCIX based on the NTIPA and the NIPF. By doing this, the DNI 
will finally have control over the NCIX, one of its subordinate offices. 
 Evaluating the effectiveness of this reform would be difficult to do from outside the 
IC and CI Community, but the regular coordination would be reflective of a better 
synchronization of priorities. Additionally, this reform would do more for the policy makers 
by ensuring that those groups that collect for them are meeting their expectations. That being 
said, the evaluation would be conducted annually by the Senate and House Select Committee 
on Intelligence who have the clearances to understand the intricate details of collection 
efforts, how effective they have been, and to what degree the CI and IC threats are 
synchronized.  
 The final improvement is to give the NTIPA more IC representation and less LE 
influence. As previously discussed in Improvement 3, the National CI Strategy is based on 
information collected from the NTIPA. Representatives from the FBI, CIA, Department of 
Justice, and Department of Defense draft the NTIPA, as a document, annually. The problem 
with this document is that it is drafted from a predominantly law-enforcement (LE) and 
defense-oriented perspective which skews priorities and only loosely aligns them to policy 
makers’ objectives140. Due to the mission of CI outlined in Chapter 3, intelligence and CI like 
to exploit, whereas LE focuses on neutralization, the priorities need to be established from an 
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intelligence centric view141. Using a predominantly LE organization to create the priorities 
for an Intelligence organization is flawed and begs for underutilization of intelligence 
assets142. The problem with changing this system is that the LE organizations are not going to 
be as interested in ceding the power they have in the NTIPA and so any sort of battles for 
power will take time away from potential reform—time that is and always will be crucial. 
This is in no way an indictment of the closeness of the IC, CI, and LE professions because 
ultimately, should a threat present itself, there needs to be a close working relationship since 
any case could potentially move between CI and LE as it develops143. 
 Fixing these problems will require the NCIX to alter the makeup of NTIPA. In order 
for this to happen, Congress would have to pass legislation, and that takes time for a group 
that often does not generally do things fast. Assuming that such a bill passes, the next best 
step would be for the DNI to reorganize the NTIPA to include members from all across the 
IC. Reorganizing as such would allow their meetings to be focused on collaboration of 
threats and discussions about how to handle them. 
 It is worth repeating that evaluating the effectiveness of this reform would be difficult 
because intelligence failures, whether real or perceived, are highly visible, but the successes 
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are not. Consequently, the best metric would probably be an analysis of the NTIPA’s 
priorities to see what amount of influence LE agencies have exerted as opposed to those in 
the IC. Comparing past years’ priorities to current ones will show the natural progression of 
frame of thought that those drafting the NTIPA had.  
 These four changes, while not dramatic, offer insights into a few things that the IC 
can do to fix the “fractured” systems in the CI Community. They maintain that there are 
valuable systems in the IC and that the “changes” should not be so dramatic as to throw out 
potentially good processes. The insider threat is too important to be tossed aside because of 
political inconveniences, only to be looked at when there have been failures. The increase in 
insider activity in the past few years is an indication that policy makers and the IC should 
place serious consideration on what needs to happen to the insider threat framework. It is sad 
that it must come down to the loss of some of the nation’s most important secrets for this to 
happen, so we must continue to work toward meaningful reform.  
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Conclusion 
 As this paper has shown, in the years since the end of the Cold War, the United States 
has spent nearly 13 years fighting international terrorism. The efforts spent overseas were a 
part of a larger mission to protect the American people and ensure global peace stability. The 
problem is that while the United States was fixated on the fight against al-Qaeda, foreign 
governments and international terrorist organizations were reorganizing, targeting the 
weaknesses that remained on the US homeland. Many governments took this as an 
opportunity to exploit weak intelligence security, through the use of spies. Additionally, 
terrorists, who had been stopped overseas, set their sights on America and began working 
with US citizens to conduct their attacks. These two threats, the American terrorist and the 
American spy, comprise what is known collectively as insider threats. This is not a new 
threat, it is one that is as old as nation-states, but it is one that is once again becoming a chief 
concern for policy makers as America’s wars come to an end and a renewed focus is placed 
on internal security. This paper has sought to answer one main question: How successful has 
the United States Intelligence Community (IC) been in responding to the increase of insider 
threats? As the last four chapters have shown, given the nature of Intelligence work, a clear 
evaluation is not possible for operational successes and failures. As was previously stated, 
the purpose of intelligence is to inform leaders of current situations and to provide them with 
the best understanding of policy actions. When intelligence does not fully inform, and bad 
policies are made, the results are often dramatic and result in policy makers blaming 
intelligence for these failures. Additionally, any correct decisions made will yield little to no 
“visible” results of success. What is apparent is that the United States has made many 
strategic reforms needed to better posture the IC to defeat the Insider Threat. These reforms 
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have been strategic successes by altering IC structures and organizations. These reforms are 
addressing insider threats from the top down for the first time in history and have been very 
beneficial to the strategic makeup of the CI Community. What effect these changes will have 
on the operational level is yet to be seen, and will in fact not be realized for several years. 
Despite these successful changes there are still reforms that are needed to bolster previous 
actions. This assessment is based on the answers to the 5 sub-questions that each chapter 
looked at in detail. 
 Chapter 1 provided a more in-depth description of an insider threat. It did so in an 
effort to identify the best definition and to demonstrate that there is a certain amount of 
disparity in the IC about the definition of an insider threat. In this discussion, greater detail 
and understanding of the different types of insider threats revealed just how similar the 
threats really are. This Chapter was essential to provide the reader a complete understanding 
of what the threat is and why the threat exists. 
 Building on this definitional effort, Chapter 2 looked at the theoretical process by 
which people become insider threats. This chapter sought to answer where insider threats 
come from and highlighted the many studies that have been conducted recently focusing on 
insider threat psychology. Identifying the answer to this question relied heavily on the 
psychological aspects of insider threats and explaining why some people decide to betray 
their country. While the goals of the two types of threats may be different, the 
“radicalization”/“spy lifecycle” processes are very similar. Additionally, this chapter is 
significant because it reveals various key considerations that must be understood when 
determining how to deal with insider threats. Chief among these considerations is 
understanding how insider threats develop. Understanding an insider threat’s origins offers 
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insights into possible preventative measures that the CI Community can use to develop 
proactive policies. 
 Chapter 3 then showed the historical evolution of the insider threat structures and the 
current structures for countering insider threats. This chapter was designed to answer the next 
two questions: how insider threats have impacted the IC, and how Insider Threat Groups 
have helped the IC to target insider threats. This chapter described the unique challenges 
facing the IC and CI Community and how the CI mission is specially adapted to counter the 
insider threat. Furthermore, the reader should understand that the current insider threat 
structure is one that has been influenced by the past and changed several times over the last 
twenty years fixing weaknesses that allowed large scale damage like that of Aldrich Ames 
and Robert Hanssen. These reactions, while bringing about a largely bureaucratic mess, have 
resulted in a few potential good systems as well that have yet fully to show the IC their true 
capacity. 
 Finally, Chapter 4 acknowledges the positive changes that have occurred but also 
emphasizes the necessity for further reform. This final chapter answers the last question 
regarding what changes are still needed. Discussing reform impediments briefly, this chapter 
reveals how time, concession of power, and consensus were the key impediments to reform 
in the CI Community and its insider threat structures. This chapter explains that four simple 
changes could bring about significant difference in the CI community and greatly assist in the 
fight against insider threats. Based on material presented in the foregoing chapters, here are 
the key recommendations for policy makers: 
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1) Establishment of a common definition of an insider threat that encompasses all 
crucial elements of an insider threat. 
2) Realign insider threat training to focus more to preventing threats, not simply 
identifying them. 
3) The NCIX and DNI should draft the National CI Strategy together and base 
priorities off the NIPF with the NTIPA serving as a supplement, not the primary 
factor. 
4) Increase IC representation and decrease LE influence in the NTIPA. 
The changes that this paper offers are not revolutionary changes, they are minor 
changes that will help the system fight the insider threat. These first improvements can help 
develop the CI community to meet current and potentially future challenges. Following these 
changes if others are required, then they can be made then, but the most important thing to 
remember is in the search for the best reforms, do not cause additional damage where there 
once was none. The question now lies in what will happen. Will the identified problems 
come under substantive reform creating systems and structures that will best help to counter 
the threat, or will the desire and drive for reform waver as memories of Manning and Hassan 
become part of the distant past?  
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